Sawt

ASSOCIATION LOI 1901 | PARIS, FRANCE

OFFICIAL HUMAN RIGHTS RESEARCH MONOGRAPH

Human Rights Status of LGBTQ+ Individuals in Libya (2026)

Legal Frameworks, Social Realities, and Paths to Protection: A Documentation & Policy Report on Fundamental Rights, Digital Threats, and Emergency Protection Needs

Published for Legal Deposit Collection at the Bibliothèque nationale de France (BnF) & AFNIL International Registry.

Publishing NGO: SAWT (منظمة صوت)
Nongovernmental Organization: RNA W751282085
Publication Year: 2026
Official Portal: https://sawt.ngo

PUBLISHING & INSTITUTIONAL METADATA

> **Official Monograph Deposit Notice:** This research document is published as an official monograph by SAWT for registration with the Agence Francophone pour la Numérotation Internationale du Livre (AFNIL) and formal legal deposit in the Bibliothèque nationale de France (BnF).

Full Name of Publishing Body: SAWT (Association loi 1901)

Legal Status: Officially registered non-profit associative entity governed by the French Law of July 1, 1901, and the Decree of August 16, 1901.

Official Address: 10 rue de Penthièvre, 75008 Paris, France

Digital Gateway: https://sawt.ngo

Contact Email: info@sawt.ngo

RNA NUMBER

W751282085 (Répertoire National des Associations)

SIREN / SIRET IDENTIFIERS

SIREN: 999 093 057 | SIRET: 999 093 057 00019

APE / NAF CLASSIFICATION

94.99Z (Autres organisations fonctionnant par adhésion volontaire)

DIGITAL OBJECT IDENTIFIER (DOI)

10.5281/zenodo.21694110

Copyright & Open Access Licensing: © 2026 SAWT. All rights reserved. This monograph is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International License (CC BY-NC-ND 4.0). Permission is granted to copy, distribute, and transmit this work for non-commercial advocacy and academic purposes, provided full attribution is rendered to SAWT and no modifications are made to the original text.

Formal Operational Security & Anonymity Disclaimer: Due to ongoing armed conflict, state fragmentation, and severe criminal persecution targeting sexual and gender minorities in Libya, all field testimonies, operational details, and case studies cited in this monograph have been subjected to rigorous anonymization protocols. Personal names, exact geographic coordinates, and identifying biometric or temporal markers have been omitted or obscured to protect beneficiaries, field informants, and humanitarian responders from reprisal.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Section / Subject Area	Coverage	Page Range
1. Title and Cover Page Layout	Official Identification	Page 1
2. Publishing Metadata & Legal Copyright	Institutional Identifiers	Page 2
3. Executive Summary & Table of Contents	Strategic Synthesis	Page 3
4. Methodology & Operational Security	Data & Field Hygiene	Pages 4 – 5
5. Legal & Institutional Framework in Libya	Statutory Penal Analysis	Pages 6 – 8
6. Social Realities & Systemic Stigma	Militia Abuse & Isolation	Pages 9 – 10
7. Tech-Facilitated GBV & Digital Threats	Cybercrime Law & Extortion	Pages 11 – 12
8. Protection Frameworks & Safe Helplines	Emergency Response Model	Pages 13 – 14
9. Strategic Recommendations	International Action Plan	Page 15
10. Academic References & Institutional Notes	Bibliography & Back Cover	Pages 16 – 17

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The human rights conditions facing Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transgender, and Queer (LGBTQ+) individuals in post-revolutionary Libya represent a severe humanitarian and legal crisis. Operating within an environment characterized by state fragmentation, active militia rule, and extreme religious conservatism, sexual and gender minorities exist under continuous threat of extrajudicial violence, arbitrary arrest, state-sanctioned torture, and digital entrapment.

This research monograph presents a comprehensive analysis of the statutory, social, and technological drivers of persecution in Libya. Rooted in the 1953 Penal Code and exacerbated by the passage of Anti-Cybercrime Law No. 5 of 2022, the state legal framework actively criminalizes consensual same-sex intimacy and non-conforming gender expressions. Concurrently, state-affiliated armed entities—including the Internal Security Agency (ISA) and moral militia units—exercise unchecked police powers, enforcing rigid social norms through arbitrary detentions and coerced online confessions.

In response to these pervasive risks, SAWT has established an integrated protection framework combining high-security digital helplines, emergency micro-grants, and operational security protocols designed to provide vital relief without compromising beneficiary anonymity. This report concludes with targeted, actionable policy recommendations for United Nations mechanisms, European authorities, tech platforms, and civil society actors.

METHODOLOGY AND OPERATIONAL SECURITY (PART 1)

Documenting human rights violations in denied-access and high-conflict jurisdictions requires specialized research methodologies capable of operating under conditions of extreme state surveillance and militia violence. The empirical foundation of this monograph draws upon primary intake data gathered through SAWT's confidential emergency support channels, structured key informant interviews, and systematic open-source intelligence (OSINT) monitoring conducted between 2025 and 2026. Primary qualitative data was collected from a sample of 58 displaced and resident Libyan LGBTQ+ individuals, local civil society actors, legal practitioners, and digital rights advocates across North Africa and Europe. Intake records were compiled using standardized, trauma-informed documentation protocols aligned with international human rights standards, including the principles outlined in the Yogyakarta Principles and the Berkeley Protocol on Digital Open Source Investigations.

To verify field testimonies and eliminate reporting biases, SAWT applied a rigorous multi-layered triangulation methodology. Primary field accounts were cross-referenced against three distinct evidentiary vectors: direct analysis of statutory enactments and judicial decrees issued by Libyan courts, comparative verification against findings published by the UN Independent Fact-Finding Mission (FFM) on Libya and the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), and digital forensic analysis of verified social media threat campaigns and extortion logs provided voluntarily by victims through SAWT's secure intake pathways.

> **Research Integrity Standard:** No primary field data was included in this monograph without passing a minimum two-point verification threshold. Allegations of physical abuse or extrajudicial detention were corroborated through collateral witness statements, medical documentation, or verified digital evidence.

Given the severe legal and physical risks associated with participation in human rights documentation in Libya, SAWT enforced strict ethical guidelines. All research participants provided explicit, informed consent obtained through encrypted audio protocols or secure digital forms. Consent processes clearly communicated the scope of publication, the measures taken to anonymize data, and the right to withdraw participation at any stage without impacting access to SAWT's emergency assistance services.

METHODOLOGY AND OPERATIONAL SECURITY (PART 2)

Operating in high-risk environments requires an operational security (OpSec) posture that assumes all external communication channels and physical transport layers are vulnerable to compromise. To safeguard beneficiaries, research participants, and field personnel from state intelligence apparatuses —such as the Internal Security Agency (ISA)—SAWT maintains a zero-trust digital infrastructure across all documentation pipelines. All incoming data streams are stripped of metadata at the point of ingestion. Internet Protocol (IP) addresses, device fingerprint identifiers, and carrier phone headers are erased automatically before data is stored within encrypted repositories.

Key technical components of SAWT's data protection architecture include Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) with 256-bit key lengths in air-gapped server environments, ephemeral communication protocols where interactive messaging with vulnerable beneficiaries is conducted exclusively through end-to-end encrypted platforms configured with automated message-deletion timers, and pseudonymization routines where case files are indexed using randomized alphanumeric identifiers. Master linkage tables connecting pseudonyms to beneficiary profiles are stored in isolated, multi-signature encrypted keys accessible only to authorized senior intake officers.

Identified Threat Vector	Primary Actor / Mechanism	SAWT Technical Mitigation Protocol
Cellular Wiretapping	State Telecom & ISA Interception	Routing via anonymized SIP trunks & encrypted SRTP voice pipelines.
Device Forensics / Confiscation	Militia Checkpoints & Police Search	Zero-local-storage client apps & remote wipe triggers on field devices.
Digital Entrapment & Honeypots	Moral Militias & Extortion Networks	Automated protocol verification & safe intake screening workflows.
Metadata Analysis & Doxxing	State Surveillance Agencies	Complete stripping of EXIF data, IP logs, and temporal markers.

Through the systematic application of these operational security safeguards, SAWT ensures that human rights documentation serves as a powerful instrument for international accountability without creating downstream security vulnerabilities for marginalized communities on the ground.

LEGAL AND INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK IN LIBYA (PART 1)

The criminalization of consensual same-sex sexual conduct and non-normative gender expressions in Libya is codified primarily within the 1953 Libyan Penal Code, enacted following independence and subsequently modified through post-colonial legislative enactments, most notably Law No. 70 of 1973. The legal structure relies on broadly drafted moral offenses that grant prosecutors and law enforcement authorities wide latitude to criminalize LGBTQ+ individuals. Primary statutory provisions utilized to penalize same-sex intimacy and gender expression are situated within Title III ("Offences Against Freedom, Honour and Morals") of the Penal Code.

Article 407(4) broadly prohibits consensual sexual relations occurring outside a recognized heterosexual marriage, prescribing custodial sentences of up to five years' imprisonment. In judicial practice, Libyan criminal courts consistently interpret this provision to encompass all forms of same-sex sexual conduct between consenting adults. Concurrently, Article 408(4) penalizes any individual who commits an "indecent act" with another person with their consent, establishing penalties of up to five years' imprisonment. Prosecutorial authorities apply this article to target physical affection, non-conforming attire, and gender-variant behaviors in public or private spaces. Furthermore, Article 421 outlaws the manufacture, possession, or distribution of materials deemed offensive to public morals, a provision routinely deployed by law enforcement to criminalize digital imagery or text messages found on personal electronic devices during arbitrary searches.

> **Judicial Precedent and Enforcement Pattern:** Libyan courts do not require explicit evidence of sexual acts to secure convictions under Articles 407(4) and 408(4). Prosecutorial practice relies heavily on circumstantial indicators, including personal appearance, social media connections, and coerced statements obtained during detention.

The statutory provisions of the Penal Code are reinforced by Law No. 70 of 1973, which harmonized criminal statutes with specific interpretations of Islamic jurisprudence (Sharia). This legislative integration established severe corporal penalties (Hudud) for extramarital sexual conduct (Zina). While the formal application of corporal punishment has varied, the statutory framework maintains that same-sex conduct constitutes a fundamental violation of state public order and religious values, denying victims access to constitutional rights or legal protection.

LEGAL AND INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK IN LIBYA (PART 2)

Following the 2011 revolution and the subsequent fragmentation of central state authority, competing executive bodies in Western and Eastern Libya issued regulatory decrees that expanded moral policing powers. Rather than initiating legal reform to align domestic law with international human rights treaties ratified by Libya, successive interim administrations codified increasingly repressive measures. Key post-2011 legislative and executive instruments impacting marginalized groups include Law No. 11 of 2016, enacted to reinforce public morality mandates by explicitly penalizing actions deemed contrary to Islamic jurisprudence and traditional societal values, providing a statutory foundation for municipal moral policing units.

Additionally, executive directives issued by both the Government of National Unity (GNU) in Tripoli and the Government of National Stability (GNS) in Benghazi empower specialized security directorates to conduct surveillance on public establishments, beauty salons, and youth gatherings. The following legal matrix outlines the core penal statutes utilized by Libyan law enforcement bodies to target sexual and gender minorities, detailing statutory sentences and operational enforcement patterns documented by SAWT:

Statutory Provision	Offense Category	Prescribed Legal Penalty	Operational Enforcement Pattern
Penal Code Art. 407(4)	Extramarital Sexual Intercourse	Up to 5 years imprisonment	Universal criminalization of male and female same-sex acts.
Penal Code Art. 408(4)	Consensual Indecent Acts	Up to 5 years imprisonment	Targeting non-normative gender expression and dress.
Penal Code Art. 421	Distribution of Immoral Content	Custodial sentence & fine	Weaponized during phone searches at militia checkpoints.
Law No. 11 of 2016	Violations of Public Morality	Discretionary custodial terms	Legal base for moral militia raids on private spaces.

Individuals arrested under morality charges face systematic denials of fundamental due process rights guaranteed under the Libyan Code of Criminal Procedure and international law. Detainees are routinely denied immediate access to legal counsel, held in unacknowledged detention beyond statutory time limits, and subjected to forced physical examinations—including forced anal examinations—which international treaty bodies classify as cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment amounting to torture.

LEGAL AND INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK IN LIBYA (PART 3)

On September 27, 2022, the Libyan House of Representatives passed Law No. 5 of 2022 on Combating Cybercrimes. Enacted without public consultation or civil society oversight, this legislation created draconian regulatory mechanisms that severely restrict digital privacy, freedom of expression, and online organization for vulnerable populations. Law No. 5 of 2022 codifies broad administrative surveillance powers and prescribes severe criminal penalties for digital communications deemed incompatible with state-sanctioned morality.

Specifically, Article 7 grants the National Information Security and Safety Authority (NISSA) sweeping authority to block websites, digital platforms, or encrypted messaging services without prior judicial authorization if content is deemed to breach "public interest" or "public morals." Articles 9 and 39 outlaw the unauthorized use, distribution, or deployment of digital encryption software, virtual private networks (VPNs), and secure communication technologies, effectively criminalizing basic digital self-defense measures utilized by human rights defenders and marginalized individuals. Furthermore, Article 37 imposes custodial sentences of no less than five years' imprisonment alongside heavy financial fines for transmitting, publishing, or storing digital content perceived to harm "social cohesion," "public order," or "religious fundamentals."

> **International Treaty Compliance Failure:** Law No. 5 of 2022 directly violates Libya's binding obligations under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights (ACHPR). Detailed legal analysis is available in SAWT's policy archive.

Libyan domestic law contains no anti-discrimination statutes, employment protections, or hate-crime provisions safeguarding individuals on the basis of Sexual Orientation, Gender Identity, Gender Expression, or Sex Characteristics (SOGIESC). Consequently, victims of bias-motivated violence, extortion, or unlawful termination have no statutory recourse. Judicial mechanisms operate not as protective bodies, but as instruments of state enforcement that reinforce systemic impunity for perpetrators while penalizing victims who attempt to report abuses.

SOCIAL REALITIES AND SYSTEMIC STIGMA IN LIBYA (PART 1)

The daily existence of LGBTQ+ individuals in Libya is structured by the omnipresence of non-state armed groups and semi-official security formations. In the absence of unified, professional state policing, security functions are exercised by armed entities integrated into official state payrolls, including the Internal Security Agency (ISA), the Stability Support Apparatus (SSA), and regional municipal militias. These armed formations operate as self-appointed guardians of public morality, actively targeting sexual and gender minorities to demonstrate religious legitimacy and consolidate local social control.

Operational tactics employed by moral militias include arbitrary raids on private residences, rental apartments, cafes, and social gatherings based on suspicion of non-normative behavior or anonymous tips. Suspects are routinely detained in informal holding centers operated outside the oversight of the Ministry of Justice, where they are held incommunicado without access to legal representation. During custody, detainees face systematic physical violence, severe beatings, forced anal examinations, and psychological abuse. Security entities regularly record forced "confessions" and publish these videos on official social media channels to publicly humiliate victims and justify ongoing clampdowns.

> **Verified Field Case Evidence:** Documentation gathered by SAWT confirms that during the 2025–2026 reporting period, state-affiliated security entities in Tripoli and Benghazi published over 30 forced confession videos featuring young individuals accused of "promoting homosexuality" and "violating public order."

Societal stigma translates into direct institutional exclusion across state services. LGBTQ+ individuals facing healthcare emergencies, physical assault, or housing instability are systematically denied access to state protection. Medical personnel frequently report patients displaying non-normative characteristics to security forces, transforming healthcare facilities into sites of legal exposure rather than medical care.

SOCIAL REALITIES AND SYSTEMIC STIGMA IN LIBYA (PART 2)

The social architecture of Libya remains deeply rooted in patriarchal family systems and tribal loyalty networks. In this environment, an individual's perceived sexual orientation or gender non-conformity is viewed as a direct threat to collective family honor, triggering severe intra-familial violence and social expulsion. Family-administered abuses documented by SAWT include enforced home confinement, physical assault, forced conversion therapy conducted by religious practitioners, forced heterosexual marriage, and total financial disownment. Victims have no recourse to state protection, as domestic law and law enforcement bodies treat intra-familial abuse as private domestic matters beyond state intervention.

Lesbian, bisexual, and transgender (LBT) women occupy a position of heightened vulnerability resulting from the convergence of state criminalization, patriarchal guardianship customs, and structural gender inequality. Under prevailing socio-legal norms, women's physical mobility is severely restricted by male guardianship practices, limiting their ability to escape abusive domestic environments or seek international asylum.

> **Intersectional Risk Factors for LBT Women Documented by SAWT:**
> - Severe restrictions on independent travel and housing access without male guardian authorization.
> - Elevated exposure to forced marriage and domestic sexual violence as corrective measures.
> - Complete absence of state-funded emergency shelters or confidential crisis housing.

To escape local persecution, targeted individuals frequently flee to larger urban centers such as Tripoli or Benghazi. However, internal displacement offers limited safety. Fleeing individuals face severe economic precarity, lack of secure housing, and continuous risk of identification at internal militia checkpoints, where mobile phones are subjected to arbitrary digital searches.

TECH-FACILITATED GENDER-BASED VIOLENCE (PART 1)

As physical spaces for social interaction have been dismantled by state repression and militia surveillance, online platforms—including social media networks, messaging applications, and location-based dating tools—initially served as vital conduits for community connection and mutual support. However, these digital environments have been aggressively weaponized by state security personnel, moral militias, and organized criminal networks across urban centers in Libya.

Tech-facilitated gender-based violence (TFGBV) in Libya is characterized by sophisticated digital entrapment (honeypot) operations. State intelligence officers and militia operatives create fictitious profiles on location-based applications to lure vulnerable individuals into physical encounters. Once the victim arrives at the designated location, they are subjected to arbitrary arrest, physical assault, extortion, and forced device confiscation. Operatives establish trust over several days, extract identifying photographs or voice notes, and coordinate a physical meeting. The resulting arrest is utilized to extract contacts from the victim's device, triggering cascade arrests across entire social networks.

> **Digital Security Alert Notice:** SAWT's tech monitoring unit regularly publishes anonymized threat assessments detailing active honeypot patterns and digital surveillance tactics active within North Africa.

Militia units operating mobile checkpoints throughout urban centers routinely demand access to personal mobile devices. Security personnel inspect installed applications, photo galleries, chat logs, and browser histories. Discovery of security software (such as VPNs or encrypted apps), dating applications, or non-normative content results in immediate detention under Law No. 5 of 2022.

TECH-FACILITATED GENDER-BASED VIOLENCE (PART 2)

Online extortion represents one of the most lucrative and pervasive forms of digital abuse targeting LGBTQ+ Libyans. Criminal syndicates and rogue militia members exploit societal stigma and strict criminal penalties to systematically blackmail victims under threat of public exposure. Extortion schemes follow a structured operational pattern: perpetrators acquire intimate imagery, private chat logs, or audio recordings through digital entrapment or device compromise. The victim is then subjected to escalating financial demands or forced compliance with illicit demands. Victims are prevented from seeking legal protection due to fear of immediate arrest under statutory morality laws.

Digital harassment routinely escalates into coordinated public doxxing campaigns on mainstream social media platforms, particularly Facebook and Telegram. Vigilante groups publish full names, home addresses, phone numbers, and social profiles of targeted individuals, accompanied by explicit calls for extrajudicial violence or murder.

Digital Threat Typology	Primary Platform / Vector	Direct Impact on Target
Location Honeypots	Dating & Messaging Apps	Physical abduction, arrest, torture in custody.
Sextortion Networks	Direct Messaging / WhatsApp	Severe financial ruin, acute psychological trauma.
Vigilante Doxxing	Public Facebook Pages / Telegram	Forced displacement, honor violence, mob attack.
Device Extraction	Physical Checkpoint Inspections	Immediate arrest under Cybercrime Law No. 5.

The psychological impact of continuous digital vulnerability is devastating, driving high rates of severe anxiety, depression, and suicidal ideation among isolated LGBTQ+ youth who possess no safe physical or digital sanctuary. Technical support resources are available via SAWT.

PROTECTION FRAMEWORKS AND SAFE HELPLINES (PART 1)

To address the critical lack of safe support channels for vulnerable populations in Libya, SAWT designed and deployed an integrated emergency intake and crisis helpline system. Operating in high-risk, denied-access environments requires a technological architecture engineered to prioritize complete beneficiary anonymity and absolute operational security. SAWT's helpline infrastructure utilizes custom cloud telephony integration designed to operate safely within hostile telecommunications environments.

Inbound voice interactions are ingested through cloud-based telephony endpoints. System protocols strip carrier origin headers, geographic IP identifiers, and hardware parameters prior to handing off voice traffic to intake specialists. Voice traffic is transported across end-to-end encrypted Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) trunks secured via Secure Real-time Transport Protocol (SRTP) and Transport Layer Security (TLS), preventing real-time interception by local telecom operators or state wiretapping apparatuses. Telephony logs, caller identifiers, and temporary session artifacts are purged automatically from volatile memory upon call termination, ensuring no recoverable data residue remains on intermediary servers.

> **Safety-First Intake Design:** The helpline architecture operates on a strict zero-knowledge principle. Beneficiaries are never required to provide legal names, exact locations, or verifiable personal identifiers to access emergency assistance from SAWT.

Incoming calls are processed through a structured multi-tier triaging workflow designed to evaluate immediate physical safety, psychological state, and digital exposure risks, ensuring rapid deployment of tailored emergency interventions without creating digital trails.

PROTECTION FRAMEWORKS AND SAFE HELPLINES (PART 2)

SAWT's protection mechanism combines immediate crisis response with long-term protection pathways, structured around four primary operational pillars: confidential Psychological First Aid (PFA) delivered by qualified specialists trained to assist individuals experiencing acute trauma or imminent violence; emergency relief micro-grants dispatched via secure digital channels to assist beneficiaries fleeing physical harm or securing temporary shelter; digital hygiene and self-defense training providing tools to audit device security, remove spyware, and neutralize extortion; and legal documentation files compiled to support international protection claims and UNHCR Refugee Status Determination (RSD) applications.

The table below summarizes SAWT's emergency intervention metrics recorded during the recent reporting cycle, demonstrating the scale of crisis demand serviced across the region:

Intervention Category	Primary Risk Vector	Total Beneficiaries Supported
Psychological First Aid	Acute Trauma / Suicidal Ideation	32 Cases Serviced
Extortion & Doxxing Neutralization	Digital Blackmail Networks	18 Cases Resolved
Emergency Relocation Grants	Imminent Militia Threat / Abuse	3 Individuals Relocated
UNHCR Protection Filings	Refugee Status Determination	3 Dossiers Submitted

This operational framework demonstrates that even within highly restrictive jurisdictions, innovative technological design paired with rigorous operational security can create effective sanctuaries for vulnerable populations.

STRATEGIC RECOMMENDATIONS

Addressing the human rights violations facing LGBTQ+ individuals in Libya requires coordinated, urgent action from multilateral bodies, donor governments, technology platforms, and civil society networks. Policy commitments must move beyond rhetoric toward active protection infrastructure.

UN mechanisms and multilateral bodies (UNHCR, OHCHR, HRC) should formally integrate SOGIESC-based violations and digital entrapment patterns into human rights monitoring on Libya, prioritize expedited Refugee Status Determination (RSD) processing and resettlement pathways for those facing acute physical threats, and press Libyan authorities during Universal Periodic Review (UPR) cycles to invalidate Articles 407(4) and 408(4) of the Penal Code and repeal Anti-Cybercrime Law No. 5 of 2022.

The EU and donor governments should allocate direct, flexible funding to independent NGOs providing emergency helplines, safe housing, and legal aid in North Africa; establish expedited emergency visa mechanisms for human rights defenders and individuals under imminent threat; and condition migration-management and security assistance to Libyan border and security entities on enforceable human rights compliance.

Technology platforms must expand Arabic-language content moderation capable of identifying local-dialect slurs, doxxing campaigns, and incitement to violence; build in safety features for high-risk zones, including screenshot blocking, location obfuscation, and entrapment alerts; and protect end-to-end encryption against state pressure for backdoor access under Law No. 5 of 2022.

Civil society networks should strengthen inter-organizational referral pathways across North Africa and Europe to streamline medical, legal, and relocation support for displaced beneficiaries, while building operational security capacity among frontline responders.

> **Policy Priority:** International engagement in Libya should condition bilateral security support on ending arbitrary detentions by semi-official moral militias, paired with tech-platform accountability and direct funding for secure emergency infrastructure operated by local civil society bodies.

COMPREHENSIVE REFERENCE LIST

Cairo Institute for Human Rights Studies (CIHRS). (2025). *Joint Submission to the Universal Periodic Review of Libya: Human Rights Restrictions and Cybercrime Enforcement*. Geneva: CIHRS.

Human Dignity Trust. (2026). *Country Profile: Legal Status and Criminalisation of LGBT Persons in Libya*. London: Human Dignity Trust.

Human Rights Watch. (2023). *Libya: Revoke Repressive Anti-Cybercrime Law - Release Individuals Held for Peaceful Expression*. New York: Human Rights Watch.

Human Rights Watch. (2025). *Submission to the Universal Periodic Review of Libya*. New York: Human Rights Watch.

International Commission of Jurists (ICJ). (2025). *Accountability for Sexual and Gender-Based Crimes in Libya: Legal Analysis of Penal Code Provisions*. Geneva: ICJ.

International Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Trans and Intersex Association (ILGA World). (2020). *State-Sponsored Homophobia: Global Legislation Overview*. Geneva: ILGA World.

Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR). (2022). *Communication on International Treaty Obligations, Privacy Rights, and Criminal Provisions in Libya*. Geneva: United Nations.

SAWT Organization. (2026). *Field Protection Reports, Helplines, and Digital Safety Architecture for Sexual Minorities in Conflict Zones*. Paris: SAWT. Available at: sawt.ngo.

UN Human Rights Council. (2023). *Report of the Independent Fact-Finding Mission on Libya* (A/HRC/52/83). Geneva: United Nations General Assembly.

U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor. (2024). *Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Libya*. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of State.

Urgent Action Fund Africa. (2026). *Algorithms of Violence: Technology-Facilitated Gender-Based Violence Against Queer Populations in Africa*. Nairobi: UAF-Africa.

World Organisation Against Torture (OMCT). (2023). *Libya: Anti-Cybercrime Law Threatens Human Rights*. Geneva: OMCT.

Methodology Verification Statement: This research monograph was compiled in full compliance with international standards for academic and human rights documentation. All sources cited have been independently verified through secondary cross-referencing or primary empirical intake logs maintained within SAWT's secure data repositories.

SAWT

ASSOCIATION LOI 1901 | PARIS, FRANCE

ABOUT SAWT ORGANIZATION

SAWT (منظمة صوت) is an independent, non-governmental organization officially registered in France under the Association Law of 1901. SAWT is dedicated to documenting human rights violations, combating tech-facilitated gender-based violence, and operating secure, confidential protection infrastructure for LGBTQ+ individuals and vulnerable populations in Libya and the wider region. Guided by the fundamental principle that bodily autonomy, privacy, and freedom from violence are universal human rights, SAWT collaborates with international partners to advocate for legal reform and protect communities in high-risk conflict environments.

OFFICIAL DEPOSIT METADATA

Publisher Identity: SAWT (Association loi 1901)

Headquarters Address: 10 rue de Penthièvre, 75008 Paris, France

Legal Identifiers: RNA: W751282085 | SIREN: 999 093 057 | SIRET: 999 093 057 00019

Official Web Portal: https://sawt.ngo

Contact Email: info@sawt.ngo

Legal Deposit: Official Digital Identifier (DOI): https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.21694110

© 2026 SAWT. Open Access CC BY-NC-ND 4.0